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I. Introduction
Studying strategic voting in PR systems seems to be a hopeless endeavor. The literature on 
electoral systems agrees that under PR many if not all incentives are absent to reduce the 
number o f parties or candidates through either strategic entry decisions o f political elites or 
strategic voting o f voters. The conclusion scholars draw from  this is that studying strategic 
voting m ight be more promising in strong (Sartori 1968) electoral systems possessing a 
variety o f incentives fo r strategic behavior.
W e argue that this conclusion is too hastily drawn. Focusing on strategic behavior o f voters, 
this paper makes a case that despite weak incentive structures o f electoral institutions we 
have to look more closely how voters actually perceive these incentives and form 
expectations about the outcome o f an election in a particular electoral system. Although we 
do not dispute that strategic voting might be easier to observe in plurality systems, even a 
small number o f strategic voters in PR systems m ight have a large political impact, though. 
Since typically single parties do not gain enough seats to form a majority government, 
coalition governments will be necessary. In the election preceding the coalition formation 
process the coordinated effort o f even a small number o f strategic voters m ight be decisive 
about the fate o f a particular coalition government. Thus, strategic voting m ight prove 
particularly relevant in PR systems despite being relatively small in absolute size.
The paper advances as follows. First, we revisit the prevalent argument in the literature that 
voters do not have the necessary informational requirements to vote strategically in PR 
systems with large district magnitudes. We will argue that instead we have to focus on how 
voters form expectations before we can derive predictions about the implications o f strategic 
voting on the success o f parties in PR-systems. Second, we derive observable implications 
o f this m icro-logic and test them  with d istrict-level election returns o f Finish parliamentary 
elections from 1991-2007 as well as with survey data stemming from the Finnish CSES data. 
Our results provide considerable support fo r our hypotheses about the expectation formation 
process o f voters and its relevance fo r the success o f parties in parliamentary elections.
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II. Weak Incentives and a Magic Vail of Ignorance?
W hat is the impact o f electoral systems on an individual’s decision-m aking process? Voters 
form preferences about the objects on the ballot, parties or candidates. W hile disagreeing on 
how to model the decision-m aking process, all traditional theories o f voting behavior agree 
that at the end voters should cast the ir vote fo r the object on the ballot they prefer most. 
Thus, the traditional political behavior literature is blind towards possible influences of 
electoral systems on vote-choice. Conversely, the comparative literature on electoral 
systems allows fo r the possibility that the same voter m ight end up voting differently 
depending on the particular electoral rules used. The hypothesized mechanism  is known as 
Duverger’s (1954) “psychological e ffect” . Voters are system atically drawn away from their 
most preferred party1, jus t because they realize that supporting a marginal party m ight be 
equivalent to wasting the ir vote given a particular electoral system. In order to avoid wasting 
their votes, voters cast a Strategie vote fo r a viable party although they prefer another one.
PR systems offer opportunities to gain seats even fo r marginal parties, particularly, if there is 
none or only a small national threshold. Therefore, the incentives fo r supporters o f such 
parties to cast a strategic vote are a p rio ri reduced. How many strategic votes ought to be 
expected? Leys (1959) and Sartori (1968) argue that the sm aller the district magnitude is, 
i.e., the fewer seats are awarded at the electoral district level, the stronger the incentives to 
vote strategically. More recently scholars argue that strategic voting fades out when district 
magnitude is greater than 5 because -  as their argum ent goes - it gets too complicated for 
voters to satisfy informational requirements (Cox 1997: 100, Cox and Shugart 1996, Sartori 
1968: 279) and to generate expectations which party is marginal. Evidence to support this 
claim comes from apparent empirical regularities based on Japanese and Colombian district- 
level results (Cox 1997: Chapter 5, Cox and Shugart 1996) as well as electoral returns in 
Spanish districts (Cox 1997: 115-117, Gunther 1989). The presented evidence does not 
explain, though, w hy there is suddenly a magic veil that makes it impossible fo r voters in 
larger districts to sort out whether a vote fo r the ir most preferred party is wasted or not. In 
fact, looking at the expectation formation process more closely as previous research has 
done we expect to find evidence o f strategic voting even in PR systems with large districts.
1 To simplify language we will just refer to political parties, even if voters can explicitly vote for candidates.
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III. A Micro-logic of Expectation Formation and Hypotheses
Voters form preferences for parties and derive a utility from voting fo r the ir most preferred 
party (Upref). Let’s denote the expected probability that a vote w ill not be wasted, i.e., a voter 
expects his or her most preferred party to win at least a seat in this district by ppref. Thus the 
expected utility, EU(pref), that his or her most preferred party is competitive to gain a seat, 
combines the traditional utility component weighted by the vo te r’s expectation. Thus, 
EU(pref) = ppref • Upref. This also implies that with probability 1- ppref no gain will be realized 
from voting fo r his or her most preferred party. Although, it seems quite likely that different 
voters employ different decision rules, we assume that voters’ decision rule is to maximize 
their expected utility from  voting. Thus, we expect voters to deviate from their most preferred 
party and cast a strategic vote, the lower the expected probability ppref, i.e., the more 
uncertain voters are that their most preferred party is able to win a seat. Voters might end up 
casting a strategic vote fo r a party they expect to be represented in the district (pstrat = 1) from 
which they derive the highest utility (Ustrat) although voting fo r such a party introduces some 
expressive costs that come with deserting the ir most preferred party on Election Day, i.e. 
EU(strat) = Ustrat - c .
Which factors determ ine these expectations? We argue that the expected probability that a 
vote will not be wasted on a vo te r’s most preferred party is a function depending on 
institutional (i) as well as dispositional (d) incentives, i.e., ppref = f(i,d). The electoral system 
provides a set o f institutional incentives while dispositional incentives are determ ined by 
intrapersonal motivations and capabilities to comprehend those institutional incentives. 
Following the logic o f previous research on electoral systems, we focus on the district 
magnitude through which all institutional incentives get channeled (e.g., Cox 1997; 
Taagepera and Shugart 1993: 112-118). The larger the district magnitude the lower the 
threshold fo r any party to gain seats (Sartori 1968: 279) and, thus, on average the higher 
their supporters expected probability Pp,^ ef that the ir vote will not be wasted.
Focusing on the m icro-logic o f expectation formation, we argue, however, that the w ay voters 
generate expectations and employ them  in the ir decision calculus is driven by dispositional 
incentives and not by institutional incentives that get channeled through the district 
magnitude as proposed by the literature. Voters do not care p e r se about the district 
magnitude. They sim ply care about whether or not a vote fo r the ir most preferred party is 
likely to be wasted.
In order to clarify the consequences o f dispositional incentives we entertain the following 
thought experiment. Take two hypothetical voters in the same electoral district, i.e., we are 
holding constant institutional incentives (i) These voters nevertheless might have 
systematically formed different expectations ppref whether a vote fo r the ir most preferred 
party is wasted sim ply because they prefer different parties.
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Suppose one hypothetical voter most prefers a party that is not in danger o f losing 
representation in the district. Thus, there is no need to vote strategically because the voter 
would expect that casting a vote fo r her m ost-preferred party would not be wasted. This is 
obviously different given that our other hypothetical voter most prefers a - at least in her 
district - marginal party. This voter should feel constraint because the expectation (ppref) that 
her most preferred party gains representation m ight be rather low. Depending on the nature 
o f the district race and holding constant institutional incentives (i), a vote fo r a marginal party 
m ight be wasted. Formally a voter casts a strategic vote if EU(strat) > EU(pref), i.e., if 
EU(strat) > ppref • Upref. Thus, given the expectation that a vo ter’s most preferred party will not 
gain representation in the district a vote fo r a marginal party is wasted. Consequently ppref 
m ight be small enough to tip the seesaw towards voting strategically. Such a voter is then 
predicted to strategically desert her most preferred party.
Voters employ appropriate decision heuristics in order to form an expectation ppref that their 
most preferred party is able to gain representation, i.e., whether the ir vote could be wasted. 
Party elites, opinion polls or the media are likely to provide attentive voters with cues about 
the outcome o f a district race. Even inattentive voters - as “cognitive m isers” (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991) -  are looking fo r a w ay to simplify the ir decision-m aking process. The electoral 
history heuristic  is probably such a short cut that is most easily available fo r such voters. 
Voters look back to previous elections. Even if they cannot recall the correct result o f this 
election, they can easily infer from  the rough coordinates o f the competitive electoral 
landscape o f previous elections to the upcoming election (Gschwend 2004; Gschwend 2007, 
3-4; Lago 2008).
The simple but crucial question supporters o f a marginal party have to answer is w hether 
they expect the ir most preferred party to gain representation in the ir district in the upcoming 
election. This expected probability (ppref), although not directly observable, should be 
systematically sm aller fo r supporters o f a party that has previously failed to gain 
representation in this district than fo r supporters o f a party that was able to gain 
representation. Thus, the incentives to vote strategically should be particularly high for 
supporters o f marginal parties if the ir party had no seat in the electoral district in the previous 
election. A  vote fo r this party is potentially wasted. It does not require much from a voter to 
figure this out. Even more, form ing expectations (ppref) this w ay should not be harder for 
voters in large districts than fo r voters in small districts. This process to form  expectations 
stays in stark contrast to the proposed ad-hoc logic in the literature that it sim ply becomes 
too hard to form expectations which party is marginal if the district magnitude is greater than 
5 (Cox and Shugart 1996: 311; Cox 1997: 100). No appeal to a magic veil o f voter ignorance 
in large districts is needed.
Moreover, we do not expect that institutional (i) and dispositional (d) incentives operate 
independently. Instead, these incentives operate conjointly and should, therefore interact to 
generate an expected probability ppref as follows. W hile parties are generally motivated to
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communicate the importance o f being represented to the ir various constituencies2, they 
should do so more forcefully in small districts than in large districts. A  small share o f votes 
might prevent a party to gain seats in a small district but can be sufficient to gain 
representation in a large district. Consequently, voters are expected to be more aware o f the 
threat to waste the ir vote the sm aller the district magnitude is. The observable implication o f 
this mechanism is consistent with what the Leys-Sartori conjecture predicts: in large districts 
on average more supporters o f a particular party should form a higher expected probability 
ppref that a vote fo r this party is not wasted, holding dispositional incentives (d) constant, than 
in sm aller districts. Thus, all institutional incentives that get channeled through the district 
magnitude define the context o f an individual’s decision-m aking process and conditions the 
effect o f strategically deserting one ’s most preferred party at the polls through the proposed 
expectation formation process.
W hat are the substantive consequences o f such an expectation formation process? Given 
that expectations are not observable, we need to generate observable implications in order 
to provide testable hypothesis about its consequences. Following the lead o f previous 
research, we will focus on party vote shares at the electoral district level. If voters do not 
expect the ir most preferred party to gain seats in the district, they should desert the ir most 
preferred party and vote strategically fo r another party that is expected to gain seats. 
Contrary to what the current literature would suggest, this should be observable even in 
large districts. Thus, the m ore likely a party  is expected to be in danger o f losing  
representation in a district, the more it should ge t pun ished by strategic desertion and, 
consequently, the sm aller its vote share in the district.
This logic also implies that parties not in danger o f losing representation will benefit from 
strategic voting. In addition to the votes o f the ir loyal supporters, they m ight win over 
strategic votes o f supporters o f parties who expect the ir party to be in danger o f losing 
representation. Thus, the less likely parties are expected to be in danger o f losing 
representation, the better they should perform at the district-level. Nevertheless, voters are 
expected to be more aware o f the threat to waste their vote the sm aller the district magnitude 
is. Thus, the effect o f  strategic desertion fo r parties tha t are expected to be in danger o f 
losing representation should be stronger the sm aller the district m agnitude is.
2 Taagepera and Shugart (1993: 118-120) show that particularly in Finland parties do not field candidates in districts 
where they have no chance of winning a seat. The observable implication is that electoral campaigns help voters to 
be aware of the possibility of wasting their vote.
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IV. The Case of Finland
Our proposed theory describes how any effects o f varying size o f the district magnitude have 
an impact on the electoral outcome. If there are no additional rules that determ ine the 
translation o f votes into seats (e.g. compensatory seats on a higher level) at the district level, 
the strategic incentives that get channeled through the district magnitude can be isolated. In 
order to test whether these incentives o f strategic voting are not only present in districts with 
small district magnitude but also -  albeit to lesser degree - in districts with higher district 
magnitude we need to introduce enough variation in the distribution o f our key independent 
variable, district magnitude, and at the same time holding constant alternative explanations. 
Thus, a case study design has an advantage over pooling data from various electoral 
systems because the impact o f social cleavages, political culture and the party system can 
be largely controlled given that the elections were held in the same country.
Moreover, if our reasoning about expectation formation and its consequences for 
voting behavior is supported by empirical evidence rather than by a vo ter’s ignorance 
argument, then a particularly hard case to dem onstrate evidence supporting our theory 
stems from a PR system with rather large m ultim em ber districts. In such an electoral system, 
following C ox and Shugart (1996), we should not find any evidence o f strategic voting, 
whatsoever. In contrast to this reasoning, we expect to find evidence o f strategic voting, 
namely system atic strategic desertion o f parties that are not likely to gain representation in a 
district. If a party is not expected to gain a seat in a particular district, voters should 
strategically desert this party compared to supporters o f this party in a district, where the 
party is expected to gain seats.
Given these institutional requirements, Finland seem s a particular hard case to look fo r any 
effects o f district magnitude on the degree o f strategic voting. Finland employs a 
m ultim em ber-district electoral system with one tie r and no compensatory seats. Additionally 
the district magnitude differs considerably - it ranges from 6 to 35 - and even the smallest 
districts are still considered relatively large by Cox and Shugart’s standards3. The voter 
casts her ballot in the district fo r a candidate o f a party. The votes o f all candidates o f one 
party will be summed up at the district level and the number o f seats fo r each party in the 
respective district is calculated by applying the d ’Hondt formula. Thus, even in a system that
3 Our argument is based on the assumption, that a voter’s expectation reflects the competitive nature of the district 
race. But in PR systems like Finland, where the result of national elections is the starting point for coalition 
bargaining process a voter might focus on the national level instead. If voters in Finland focus on national results in 
order to derive their expectations one might observe in small districts less strategic desertion than we would 
otherwise expect if voters focus on the local level to form their expectations. Thus, we potentially underestimate the 
relationship of district magnitude and strategic desertion if voters derive their expectations based on the competitive 
nature of the national rather than the local race at the district level.
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allows fo r personal preference votes the party-logic o f the system prevails (Kuusela 1995, 
Pesonen 1995).4
V. Data, Operationalization and Results
Since our hypotheses are geared at the electoral d istrict-level we employ actual election 
returns in order to test them .5 Particularly we pool data from all national elections in Finland 
since 1991, because since the end o f the 1980s and the establishm ent o f the Green Party 
(VIHR) the party system has been very stable (Sänkiaho 1995).6 We omit the most recent 
election o f 2011 because o f its exceptional character (the spectacular rise o f True Finns 
party makes the comparison hard with previous elections, see Nurmi and Nurmi 2012). Thus, 
through selection this particular time frame we can hold m acro-level trends in the 
developm ent o f the party system constant.
Contrary to previous research we explicitly formulate predictions about the impact o f district 
magnitude on the amount o f strategic voting that favors or penalizes certain parties. 
However, the standard dependent variable in the literature, the effective number o f parties, 
as an aggregate measure o f the nature o f district party competition, does not directly reflect 
that.7 Rather, the effective num ber o f parties is a sum m ary measure where different 
conceivable constellations o f a d istrict-level race score the same. Instead, the natural 
candidate o f a dependent variable that is substantively more relevant and theoretically 
tailored more precisely to our hypotheses is the district-level result o f various parties. In 
order to hold the influences o f the party system constant we analyze district-level election 
returns o f those seven parties that were continuously represented in parliament during our 
time o f analysis. Thus, we employ one dependent variable: the vote share o f each o f the 
seven parties in 14 electoral d istricts8 in the last five elections (1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 
2007). One party (RKP) did not compete everywhere. Thus, we have a total o f 441 valid 
observations.
4 Ortega Villodres (2003) shows, that Finnish voters disperse their votes widely among the candidates within a party 
-  but this has merely implications for the level of intra-party competition.
5 Ideally, a panel survey design of eligible voters clustered on the electoral district level is needed to test our theory 
about the expectation formation process and strategic voting in a PR system such as Finland on the individual-level. 
This is, however, not available.
6 The data is provided by ‘Statistics Finland’, the governmental statistical office, and can be downloaded from 
http://www.stat.fi/index_en.html. According to personal information provided by Jaana Asikainen from ‘Statistics 
Finland’ redistricting between 1991 and 2003 is not a problem. In one district, between 1999 (Mikkeli district) and 
2003 (South Savo), there was some minor redistricting. Nevertheless besides renaming, the new South Savo district 
still has about 85 % of the eligible voters of the former Mikkeli district.
7 Nevertheless, holding other factors constant, the effective number of parties should decline over time in districts 
where some marginal party supporters (of various parties) vote strategically, because these parties will be deserted 
and the larger parties will benefit from it in a given district.
8 We exclude the autonomous province of Aland from our analysis because this district does not participate in the 
national seat-allocation system (Kuusela 1995: 24).
12 — Gschwend, Stoiber/ Strategie Voting in  Proportional Systems — I H S
According to Duverger’s Laws the Finnish party system is characterized by its fragmentation. 
During the last decades the Social Dem ocratic Party (SDP), the agrarian Center Party 
(KESK) and the conservative National Coalition Party (KOK) became the dom inant parties in 
Finland. Four relevant sm aller parties were continuously represented during our time of 
analysis: the left-wing VAS, the Green Party (VIHR), the Christian Democrats (KD)9 and the 
Swedish Regional Party (RKP). The existence o f several rainbow coalitions shows that the 
ideological barriers between parties cannot be very h igh.10 A dividing line o f the party system 
(apart from the ideological) is the difference between the rural north and the urban centers of 
Finland (Sundberg 2000). The SDP has it biggest support in the industrial centers o f the 
South and shares the support o f the land workers and small farmers fo r left parties with its 
left counterpart, the VAS, in the rural north. The KOK is a strong party in the urban centers 
while its conservative counterpart, the KESK, is strong in the periphery o f the country. A 
sim ilar pattern is recognizable fo r the sm aller parties. The Greens have the ir strongholds in 
urban districts like Helsinki whereas the VAS is stronger in the periphery. The KD is a small 
party, which has success throughout the country. The liberal RKP is jus t a regional party, 
which is supported by the Swedish-speaking m inority (Sänkiaho 1995, Martikainen and 
Yrjönen 1991).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics o f the Dependent Variable by Party
District Vote Shares Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Greens (VIHR) 6.5 3.7 1.5 20.4
KD 4.3 2.2 0.8 9.8
KESK 26.4 11.8 3.7 49.8
KOK 18.5 6.2 8.8 30.4
VAS 10.6 5.6 1.7 27.1
RKP 10.8 6.1 0.2 20.7
SDP 24.7 7.1 11.3 39.4
As table 1 shows, all parties vary noticeably in the ir strength across electoral districts. Thus, 
the expectation formation process o f a voter preferring a specific party may vary from  one 
district to another. E.g., if a voter prefers the VAS in a relatively large district, where the VAS 
is traditionally strong (say over 20%), this voter has a lower incentive to strategically desert 
this party than in a relatively small district, where the VAS is traditionally weak (say jus t 5%).
9 This party changed its name and was formerly known as the Finnish Christian League (SKL).
10 If we are willing to believe, that the ideological distance is the main factor in determining voters’ utility from voting, 
the costs of strategic voting seem not to be that high and we should observe a significant level of strategic voting.
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W hat would happen if we were wrong and voters sim ply cast the ir votes fo r the party they 
prefer most? The observational implication o f this individual-level process on the district level 
would be that parties vote shares should be predictable by past performances in that district. 
Given the low electoral volatility within electoral districts (Pesonen 1995) and the stable party 
system in Finland during the tim e o f our analysis (Sundberg 2000), a party’s previous vote 
share should be a strong predictor. Thus, we need some kind o f normal vote baseline to not 
falsely overestimate the effect o f strategic desertion on a party’s vote share at the district 
level. O ur normal vote (N o r m a lVote) measure is a party’s previous vote share in that 
district. This is a very conservative measure since every party’s previous vote share 
comprises both, its latent support in that district in addition to the num ber o f strategic votes 
that e ither favored or penalized this party in the previous election. Therefore, we potentially 
underestimate the num ber o f votes that are strategically cast or w ithdrawn from  a latent level 
o f sincere party support in a given district.
The Leys-Sartori conjecture posits that the sm aller the district magnitude is, i.e., the fewer 
seats are awarded at the electoral district level, the stronger the incentives to vote 
strategically. We argued, that this effect o f the district magnitude depends on the expectation 
whether a vo ter’s preferred party is endangered to lose representation. However, since it is 
likely that the marginal impact o f district magnitude M  on party vote shares at the district 
level dim inishes if M  gets larger we logistically transform  the district magnitude (log(M)) to 
account fo r that. Moreover, our theoretical contribution is to point out the conditionality o f this 
conjecture as a consequence o f the described heterogeneity o f the expectation formation 
processes that might go on at the individual level. As hypothesized, we anticipate a reduced 
impact o f institutional incentives on a party’s vote share fo r larger d istricts if this party is 
expected to be in danger o f losing representation. Given the logic behind the electoral history 
heuristic we measure this expectation (Expectation) simply by a dum m y variable that scores 
‘one’ in a given district if this party had gained no seat in the previous election. In our data 
the number o f such critical districts varies considerably across parties as can be seen in 
table 2.
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Table 2: Expectations whether vote fo r party  is wasted
Party Districts with 
Expectation = 0
Districts with 
Expectation = 1
Sum
Greens (VIHR)
KD
KESK
KOK
VAS
RKP
SDP
27
37
68
68
55
20
70
43
33
2
2
15
1
0
70
70
70
70
70
21
70
No. of Districts 345 96 441
In order to test, whether expectations have a system atic effect on party vote shares at the 
district level we w ill estimate the following model:
Y = b0 + b^- N o r m a lVote  + b2-log(M ) + b j-E xpectatio n  + s
We hypothesized that parties should get strategically deserted, i.e. they get system atically 
sm aller vote shares at the district level, if voters expect the party to be in danger o f losing 
representation (i.e., if Expectation  =1). Therefore, we expect the respective coefficient (b3) 
to be negative. This relationship should hold no matter whether a party competes in small or 
large districts. We also control fo r a baseline level o f votes a party would normally expect to 
gain in each district.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that the effect o f expectations is conditional on the incentives 
that get channeled through the district magnitude. We, therefore, add an interaction effect to 
the above model. Thus, the general specification is as follows:
Y = b0 + b i-N o r m a lVo te  + b2-log(M ) + b j- Expec tatio n  + b4-log (M )-E xpectatio n  + s
Our quantity o f interest is the size o f the causal effect o f Expectatio n , which is the difference 
in predicted vote shares when Expectation  changes from 1 to 0. Plugging in those values 
we get:
Y(Expec tatio n  = 1) = b0 + b i- N o r m a lVote  + b2-log(M ) + b3 + b4-log(M ) 
Y(Expectatio n  = 0) = b0 + b -  N o r m a lVo te  + b2- log(M)
I H S — Gschwend, Stoiber/ Strategie Voting in  Proportional Systems — 15
and, consequently, the causal effect o f Expectation  is
Y(Expectatio n  = 1) - Y(Expectatio n  = 0) = b3 + b4-log(M )
If our theory o f how expectations are formed at the individual-level is correct, the observable 
implication we expect to find is that there is more strategic desertion the sm aller the district 
magnitude is. This implies that the causal effect o f Expectation  should be larger in absolute 
terms in sm aller districts and should eventually level out if the district magnitude increases. 
Nevertheless, and in contrast to previous research, there should be a system atic level of 
strategic desertion observable even in large districts, in particular in districts with a district 
magnitude greater than M = 5.
We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate party vote shares in each district. The 
standard errors are clustered by party and electoral district to account fo r the non- 
independence in the data structure. Table 3 shows our estimation results fo r both models.
Table 3: Estim ated effects o f expecting a party no t to gain representation on party vote 
shares in Finnish parliam entary elections, 1991-2007
Party Vote Shares 
(1991-2007)
(1) (2)
N o r m a l  V o t e 0.94*** 0.94***
(0.01) (0.01)
log(M) -0.45 -0.75*
(0.31) (0.38)
E x p e c t a t io n -0.78** -4.26***
(0.32) (1.55)
EXPECTATION*log(M) 1.41**
(0.58)
C o n s t a n t 2.49** 3.35***
(0.97) (1.18)
Adjusted 0.92 0.92
N = 441. Clustered standard errors (by district*party) in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results across both models indicate that the Finnish party system is in fact rather stable 
during those elections. A  party’s vote share in the previous elections pretty much determ ines 
its vote share in the upcoming election. Holding everything else constant, the respective
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coefficient indicates that each party can expect to get on average 94% o f the vote share in 
the previous election. Although the N o r m a lVo te  coefficient is significantly different from one, 
a party’s vote share in the previous election is the single most reliable indicator across all 
parties.
Moreover, we find in model 1 as expected a significant negative coefficient b3 fo r the effect of 
EXPECTATION on the success o f parties. If a party faces the danger o f losing representation 
-  because the party did not win a seat in this district in the previous election -  its vote share 
shrinks on average about .8 percentage points. Thus, we find the hypothesized dispositional 
incentives that cause strategic desertion through the mechanism o f expectation formation to 
be in work across all parties and electoral districts no matter o f which size these districts are.
Furthermore we expect that institutional and dispositional incentives operate conjointly when 
voters form their expectations as to whether a vote fo r the ir most preferred party is going to 
be wasted. For party vote shares at the electoral district level this implies that parties that are 
not expected to win a seat should get strategically deserted more often the sm aller the 
district magnitude is. In figure 1 we calculate the causal effect o f expectations as the 
difference o f a predicted vote share, where the vo te r’s preferred party is in danger to lose 
representation (Expectation  = 1) as opposed to a situation, where the party is expected to 
win at least a seat in the electoral district (Expectation  = 0). The difference in predicted vote 
shares fo r those scenarios are plotted on the vertical axis. The district magnitude is shown 
on the horizontal axis. The labels on the horizontal axis indicate the district magnitudes that 
are actually represented in the data we analyze. W hile the line indicates the predicted point 
predictions o f the causal effect o f expectations on a party’s success on the polls, the shaded 
area indicates the respective 95% -confidence intervals.
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F igure  1: Size o f the causal effect o f expectations. Strategic Desertion is a t work.
The figure indicates that the point predictions are sm aller than zero until a district magnitude 
o f about 20. This implies that on average parties could expect to get strategically deserted by 
their supporters if they would not have won at least one seat in those districts in the previous 
election. For larger d istricts voters’ expectations and therefore strategic voting seem not to 
play a crucial role. At least if the district magnitude is sm aller than 14, the horizontal 0% -line 
is still above the upper bound o f the respective confidence interval. Thus, the estimated 
causal effect indicates that there is a statistically significant difference whether voters 
actually expect the ir most preferred party to be represented or not. If a party is not expected 
to gain representation (Expectation  =1) the party loses on average almost two percentage 
points due to voters trying to avoid wasting their votes in a district with M=6 as opposed to a 
district o f the same size where this party is expected to gain at least one seat. These effects 
are rather s im ilar in size to the ones found in a less controlled environment than here using 
electoral district vote shares o f parties in Portuguese parliamentary elections (Gschwend 
2007b).
So fa r we have seen the consequence o f our assumed mechanism, the expectation 
formation process, that determ ines whether voters cast a vote fo r the ir most preferred party 
or not. There are no good measures to assess directly how voters form  their expectations 
whether a vote fo r the ir most preferred party is likely to be wasted. However, we have seen 
that there are predictable consequences o f such expectations fo r party vote shares at the 
electoral district-level. This is the level o f analysis o f most studies that examine the impact of 
electoral systems on vote-choice.
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A more direct test o f our theory, though, should be geared at the individual level. Although 
there are also no d irect measures o f how voters form expectations, an observable 
implication o f the expectation formation process is that voters should be less likely to cast a 
sincere vote, i.e., a vote fo r the ir most preferred party if the ir most preferred party did not win 
a seat in the ir electoral district in the previous election. Following the electoral history 
heuristic such voters would expect a vote fo r the ir most preferred party to be wasted. In 
order to provide evidence fo r this observable implication we turn to the Finnish module o f the 
CSES data. Two Finnish election studies are part o f the CSES data, 2003 and 2007. Data of 
those two elections have been also part o f the district-level analysis above.
Pooling data o f both election studies we try to find whether voters in electoral district where 
their most preferred party -  as measured by the standard CSES like/dislike scale -  did not 
win a seat previously are less likely to vote fo r this party as voters whose most preferred 
party did win at least a seat previously, i.e., in the parliamentary elections o f 1999 and 2003, 
respectively. We find that supporters o f a party that won at least one seat in the respondent’s 
district are on average about 88% likely to cast the ir vote fo r this party. Those predicted 
probabilities decrease to 69%, if those supporters are eligible to vote in a district where this 
party did not win a seat in the previous elections. This difference in predicted probabilities is 
systematic and not due to chance alone. Thus, while there is evidence supporting our theory 
at the district-level we, additionally, have found evidence fo r an observable implication o f our 
theory at the individual-level as well.
To sum up, expectations matter fo r voters’ decision-m aking process. The w ay voters form 
expectations allows them  even in districts with large district magnitudes to behave 
strategically, in contrast to what the current literature suggests, and try to avoid wasting their 
votes in the polling booth on parties that are not expected to gain representation in their 
electoral district.
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VI. Conclusion
In this paper we make a case that despite weak incentive structures o f electoral institutions 
there might be nevertheless indications o f strategic voting. Contrary to the literature we do 
not see w eak institutional incentive structures as indicative o f a hopeless endeavor for 
studying strategic voting. The crucial question is how institutional incentives constrain an 
individual’s decision-making process. We argued that we have to look more closely at how 
voters actually perceive these incentives and form  expectations about the outcome o f an 
election in a particular electoral system in order to evaluate and finally predict their voting 
behavior. Based on expected utility maxim ization, we put forward a m icro-logic o f an 
individual’s expectation formation process. W e assume that this process can reflect both, 
institutional as well as dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote 
strategically that get channeled through the district magnitude are moderated by 
dispositional factors in order to become relevant fo r voting decisions. Employing district-level 
data from Finland -  because o f its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we 
find considerable evidence fo r observable implications o f our theory. Moreover, we find 
evidence fo r the assumed process that determ ines strategic desertion o f non-viable parties 
at the individual-level using Finnish survey data as well.
Across all parties we find that if they are expected to be in danger o f losing representation 
their supporters strategically desert these parties. Voters are less likely to desert them and 
consequently these parties perform better in large districts than in small districts.
If voters actually try to avoid wasting their votes on marginal parties even in large districts o f 
Finland, contrary to what the literature based on C ox (1997) and Cox and Shugart (1996) 
implies, it is quite likely that voters behave sim ilarly in other PR systems as well. If this is the 
case, the results o f our paper would suggest that the relationship between PR and 
fragmentation o f party systems need to be revisited. PR systems per se do not “cause” party 
system fragmentation just because o f the missing incentives fo r voters to strategically desert 
marginal parties. Since they do, however, the association between electoral systems and the 
number o f parties is more complicated than the current literature suggests.
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